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DEREGULATION OF LESOTHO’S MAIZE MARKET 
 




During the past year, there have been major policy reforms in Lesotho and South Africa with 
respect to maize pricing and marketing. In Lesotho the impact of deregulation on producers, 
consumers and government revenues was substantially lower than it should have been, and 
as a result Lesotho was not able to reap the full benefits of these changes. This is partly 
because information on the changes to the maize marketing system did not reach the potential 
beneficiaries of the new system. Free and easily accessible information is an essential element 
of a free market system. SACU countries must ensure the availability of information if they 
want to compete internationally. 
 
DEREGULERING VAN LESOTHO SE MIELIEMARK 
 
Daar was gedurende die afgelope jaar groot beleidshervormings in Lesotho en Suid-Afrika in 
verband met mielieprysbepaling en -bemarking. In Lesotho was die impak van deregulering 
op produsente, verbruikers en regerinsinkomste aansienlik kleiner as wat dit moes wees en 
Lesotho was daarom nie in staat om die volle voordeel uit hierdie veranderings te behaal nie. 
Dit is gedeeltelik so omdat inligting omtrent die veranderings in die mieliebemarkingsisteem 
nie die potensieële bevoordeeldes van die nuwe sisteem bereik het nie. Vrye en makklik 
toeganklike inligting is 'n essensiële element van 'n vrye bemarkingsisteem. Lidlande van die 
Suider-Afrikaanse doeane-unie ooreenkoms moet die beskikbaarheid van inligting verseker as 




During 1996, the government of Lesotho announced its intention to move away 
from an agricultural strategy aimed at attaining national food self-sufficiency 
towards food security. It has been argued that a key area of policy reform 
necessary to implement this new strategy successfully, includes the deregulation 
of the main agricultural output and input markets. These were characterised by 
considerable Government intervention in the form of price fixing and trade 
protection granted to agricultural parastatals. 
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In a previous paper, Van Schalkwyk et al (1996) calculated the welfare effects of 
regulation in Lesotho’s wheat market. This paper provides reasons why Lesotho 
had to deregulate its maize market. Moreover, it shows the welfare impacts of 
Lesotho’s maize pricing and marketing policies. The objective of this study is to 
quantitatively estimate the impact of deregulation in the maize market on 
producers, consumers and government revenues. This is compared with the 
current situation in Lesotho approximately one season after deregulation. 
Deficiencies in the system are pointed out and recommendations made. 
 
2.  THE COUNTRY IN CONTEXT 
 
More than 85 percent of Lesotho's populace lives in rural areas, engaging mainly 
in informal economic activities. Agriculture is the main occupation of the 
majority of rural inhabitants. However, it only accounts for a small share of rural 
household income (World Bank, 1995). The major share of rural household 
income is derived from remittances from absentee family members -- mainly 
males -- who engage in migrant labour activities. 
 
About 80 percent of the people live in the lowlands and foothills that comprise 
30 percent of the land area. These areas contain most of Lesotho's scarce arable, 
productive land. Land in the highlands and the Senqu River Valley, which is 
rapidly eroding, is suitable mainly for grazing and for low population densities. 
All over the country, rainfall is sporadic and unreliable, and drought or 
hailstorms often wipe out entire crops. Crop production almost always is 
heavily dependent on rainfall, as irrigation possibilities are very limited. Only 9 
percent of Lesotho's total land area is arable, of which only a relatively small 
proportion is of high potential (World Bank, 1995). 
 
Lesotho is a landlocked country surrounded by South Africa, from where 95 
percent of its imports come and where 40 percent of its exports go to. Lesotho is 
part of the Rand Monetary Area; its Loti is tied to the South African Rand at a 
fixed exchange rate of 1:1. It is also a member of the South African Customs 
Union (SACU). In terms of this agreement, South Africa (or another country) 
collects its trade taxes at the point of entry into the SACU. These taxes accounted 
for half of Lesotho's budget revenues (excluding grants) between 1988 and 1993 
(World Bank, 1995). South Africa dominates the southern African region in 
terms of agricultural and industrial production and trade. The linked currencies 
and a relatively open border therefore de facto imply that price levels of goods in 
Lesotho are often determined in South Africa, and are frequently more 
dependent on South Africa's policies and economy than that of Lesotho. In 
addition, the 1986 census found that nearly half of Lesotho's adult male workers 




labourers working in South African mines accounted for about half of the 
country's gross national product (GNP), and equalled 100 percent of its gross 
domestic product (GDP). Presently, about 40 percent of the male Basotho labour 
force is employed in South Africa and remittances account for roughly one third 
of GNP. 
 
Lesotho's agriculture is relatively open to external influence. Since South Africa 
and Lesotho are members of the SACU, no import tariffs are levied on trade 
between the two countries. For those commodities for which the Government of 
Lesotho (GOL) does not restrict importation, price trends and changes in South 
A f r i c a  d i r e c t l y  a f f e c t  p r i c e s  i n  L e s o t h o .  H o w e v e r ,  i n  t h e  c a s e  o f  m a i z e ,  t h e  
Government of Lesotho has, in the past, based gazetted into-mill prices on the 
pan-territorial selling prices of the South African Maize Board within South 
Africa (Bayley, 1993; Westlake, 1996). Thus, there has been an indirect, but 
strong, link between prices in South Africa and Lesotho. After liberalising the 
marketing of maize in Lesotho, changes in South African prices should have a 
rapid direct impact on prices in Lesotho. 
 
3.  LESOTHO’S AGRICULTURAL POLICIES (1967 - 1996) 
 
Until 1996, the marketing of maize in Lesotho was primarily governed by the 
1967 Agricultural Marketing Act, the 1979 Marketing Amendments Act and 
various Legal Notices. The 1967 Marketing Act empowered the Minister of 
Agriculture to gazette regulations and/or intervene in the marketing of 
maize. The government of Lesotho intervened in the domestic markets of 





There has for a number of years been no formal policy to restrict imports of 
maize (Ministry of Agriculture, 1995). However, many traders argued that in 
practice it was very difficult to import significant quantities of maize into 
Lesotho (Bayley, 1994). Furthermore, maize imports were restricted 
immediately after harvest. Maize could be imported from South Africa 
through the South African Maize Board. However, the large mills tended to 
dominate such processes. In the 1992/93 marketing season, the three big mills 
were responsible for 97% of the 189 500 tonnes of commercial maize imports 
for which permits were issued (Bayley, 1993). In practice, the large mills 
imported maize without restriction. Permits to import maize meal were only 
issued if the large-scale mills were unable to meet domestic demand fully. At 







Prices were controlled by the government at three levels of the marketing 
chain: 
 
−  for whole grain: into-traders’ depots; and into-mill, at the mill-gate; 
−  for milled products: ex-mill, at the mill gate. 
 
Provided they met minimum quality standards, large mills were obliged to 
accept, and pay the gazetted price, for maize delivered to them by Lesotho 
producers. There was no effective control of prices at which the large-scale 
mills sold from their depots in the districts, of the selling prices of the small-
scale roller mills or of wholesale and retail prices. Prices were gazetted at the 
start of the marketing year. All gazetted prices were pan-seasonal and -
territorial. 
 
4.  THE IMPACT OF MARKET INTERVENTION IN LESOTHO 
 
The conventional wisdom is that controlled prices for maize and maize meal in 
Lesotho have been set at artificially high levels, well above those which would 
have existed in a free market, thereby encouraging the production of maize at 
the expense of other crops. 
 
In the case of maize, this contention has been based partly on the fact that the 
gazetted producer prices in Lesotho have been well above producer prices in 
South Africa. However, Lesotho has had to purchase its maize from the Maize 
Board, not from South African farmers. The Government, therefore, used the 
higher South African Maize Board selling price as the basis for setting domestic 
producer prices. Furthermore, the cost of maize imported from South Africa, 
landed in Maseru, included transport costs dependent not on the proximity of 
South African maize production to Lesotho's mills, but on the location of the 
silos which housed the maize allocated to Lesotho buyers by the South African 
Maize Board. Railage from Schweizer Reneke to Maseru is far higher than from 
Ladybrand or Kroonstad. Thus, the gazetted producer prices have 
approximated import parity. In practice, maize grain prices in informal domestic 
markets in Lesotho have tended to be higher than the gazetted prices for maize 
grain at traders’ depots (Bayley, 1994). This is due to a combination of (a) the fact 
that whole maize has not been imported in sufficient quantities to keep the price 
down to import parity, and (b) that the alternative source of imported maize has 




large mills and (c) that most areas of Lesotho are deficit, not surplus, maize areas 
within a few months after harvest (Bayley, 1994). 
The process which has led to high informal whole grain prices in the domestic 
market is simple: Consumers in Lesotho had the option of buying domestically 
produced whole grain from farmers or traders and having it milled, or buying 
pocketed maize meal produced by the large mills, from maize that was for the 
most part imported from South Africa. Between the marketing years 1985/86 
and 1989/90 inclusive, the proportion of the maize milled at the three big 
industrial mills that was delivered by Basotho farmers to the mill gate was 
between 2.5% and 14.9%. In 1992/93 that figure was a mere 1.1% (Bayley, 1993). 
The figures demonstrate that traditionally Lesotho's industrial mills have 
profited most when the Lesotho crop has been at its smallest. Normally, a 
consumer is not prepared to pay more for whole grain than the price of pocketed 
maize meal less the cost of having the whole grain processed at a small-scale mill 
(Bayley 1993; 1994). Thus, the retail price of pocketed maize meal in the formal 
market placed a ceiling on the price of whole grain in informal markets. This 
ceiling was substantially higher than the gazetted price for whole grain at 
traders’ depots, which, is set approximately at import parity. This is for a 
number of reasons. First, the unit costs of milling grain in the large-scale mills is 
substantially higher than in small-scale mills (Ministry of Agriculture, 1995). 
Second the cost of formal packaging is usually greater than the cost of the bag-
container used for transport to and from a small-scale mill. Third, there is no 
retail margin. Finally, the retail price of the maize meal produced in the large-
scale mills is subject to sales tax at 10 percent, whereas most small-scale trade in 
grain evades this tax (Ministry of Agriculture, 1995). 
 
The welfare impacts of the interventions in Lesotho’s maize industry are 
quantified using a standard partial equilibrium comparative analysis in the 
Marshallian surplus framework, similar to that adopted by Bale & Lutz (1981), 
Bale & Greenshields (1987) and Tsakok (1990). The basic analytical structure is 
presented by the equations in Table 1, as taken from Tsakok (1990). Data for 
the analysis of welfare gains/losses induced by the policies which impacted on 
production, consumption, trade etc. of maize in Lesotho were obtained from the 
Ministry of Agriculture (1994), Buro of Statistics (1994) and the National Early 
Warning Unit (1995). The calculations were done for the 1991/92 to 1995/96 
production seasons. 
 
Lesotho’s gazetted prices represent domestic prices for maize meal. Maize meal 
sold by the industrial mills contains 70% white maize meal and 30% yellow 
maize meal (in the 1995/96 marketing season). South African selling prices of 
maize grain were adjusted accordingly. South African prices were used because 




Africa. An effect of the recent maize market liberalisation in South Africa is that 




Table 1:  Welfare analysis of maize trade and processing, 1991/92 to 1995/96 
 
Variable Label  Formula  Prices/Values1 















domestic price of maize meal (mill gate) 
“border” price of maize meal (mill gate) 
price elasticity of demand2 
price elasticity of supply2 
Nominal Protection Coefficient 
implicit tariff 
 
value of domestic production at domestic price 













































































deadweight loss in production 
deadweight loss in consumption 
change in producer surplus 
change in consumer surplus 
change in mill revenue 



















































Notes: 1) Prices are in M/ton and values are in M million 
             2) Price elasticities are taken from Wright and Nieuwoudt (1993) 




Lesotho. Transport costs and the processing profits and operating expenses of 
private village mills were added to the South African selling price of maize, as 
reported by the Directorate: Agricultural Statistics and Management Information 
(1997), to represent the border price of maize meal. The existence of a difference 
suggests an efficiency loss, or an implicit "tariff" on consumers. 
 
An effort was made to calculate price elasticities for the supply and demand of 
maize in Lesotho. Data availability presented some problems, as the available 
time series are relatively short which restricts estimation possibilities. However, 
both the price elasticities of supply and demand yielded results that are not 
significantly different from zero, which implies total price inelastic supply and 
demand for maize. These results were consistent regardless of the methodology 
and functional specification used. These results are in accordance with a priori 
expectations for a country like Lesotho:  
 
(i)  the price elasticity of supply is expected to be very low -- approximating 
zero -- when the one crop dominates the production scene as is the case 
with maize, when there are no obvious production substitutes, and when 
most of the households only produce for own consumption, within a 
relatively limited and poor production environment; and  
 
(ii)  the price elasticity of demand is very low --also approximating zero-- if 
the crop is the dominant staple, it dominates the consumer market, and 
has no immediate substitutes, within a relatively isolated consumer 
market. Of all the variables tested in the different regression equations, 
only rainfall yielded significant results and then only with respect to the 
supply of maize. The better the rainfall during the planting season, the 
more maize is planted and harvested --i.e. it affects both intended and 
actual supply. 
 
Although the elasticities that were obtained are plausible, theory stipulates that 
both quantity demanded and supplied should show some reaction --albeit 
small-- to price changes, particularly within a normal competitive environment. 
It has already been illustrated that the situation with respect to marketing of 
maize in Lesotho was not conducive to smallholder grain production and/or 
competition. For this reason, it was decided to rather use comparable price 
elasticities of supply and demand derived for South Africa under similar 
conditions. Although these elasticities are also relatively small (inelastic), the 
advantage is that they are significantly different from zero, which allows for 
analysis of the welfare implications of alternative marketing arrangements on 
producers and consumers. 




The deadweight losses in maize production for the 1994/95 and 1995/96 
seasons are estimated at M0.439 million and M0.384 million, respectively. For 
maize consumption, deadweight losses are estimated at M2.16 million and 
M1.883 million, respectively. This yields a total deadweight efficiency loss of 
M2.599 million for the 1994/95 season and M2.267 million for 1995/96 season. 
The following welfare gains and losses were calculated: 
 
−  producers of maize gained M33.23 million during the 1994/95 season and 
M31.81 million during the 1995/96 season; 
 
−  consumers of maize lost M39.93 million during the 1994/95 season and 
M39.21 million during the 1995/96 season. This amounts to a loss of 
approximately M20 per capita per annum; and 
 
−  mills benefited (as monopoly rents -profits or absorbed as inefficiencies) 
M11.60 million during the 1994/95 season, and M11.46 million during the 
1995/96 season. 
 
It should be noted that the per capita consumer loss would have been larger if 
it were not for the subsidies which the three industrial mills received from 
Government. This ultimately leads to lower gazetted consumer prices. In 
Lesotho, distortions arose because of:  
 
(i)  the import ban on milled maize;  
 
(ii) the  de facto monopoly on maize grain importation and pricing; and  
 
(iii)  the oligopoly and subsidisation of large retailers. In the above analyses, 
only the welfare implications of the monopoly situation in which the 
mills found themselves were analysed. According to the World Bank 
(1995), the inefficiencies arose from the mill’s monopolistic profits and 
inefficient operations, as compared to the profits and operating costs 
incurred by private smaller-scale millers in Lesotho’s villages. 
 
6.  RECENT POLICY CHANGES 
 
During the second semester of 1996 and the first semester of 1997 there have 
been major policy reforms in Lesotho and South Africa. Almost all 
intervention in Lesotho’s maize market has been suspended (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1997): 




•  Regulations that restrict or distort the flow and prices of maize grain and 
meal have been removed. 
   
•  Regulations that restrict the flow of inputs used in maize production have 
been abolished. 
   
•  The Lesotho Government is currently privatising the Lesotho Flour Mills. 
 
The liberalisation of the South African maize market allows South African 
producers to sell to anyone, even to foreigners. After this change and 
Lesotho’s own liberalisation process, it is possible for the inhabitants of 
Lesotho to buy South African maize and/or maize meal. One would therefore 
expect South African and Lesotho maize prices to differ with only the 
transport cost. This assumes no transaction costs, which clearly is not the case 
given informal markets and small traders. However, traders are not 
necessarily small. Therefore, transaction costs in excess of 15% seems very 
high, indicating that the market is not functioning well (effectively). 
 
A quick survey has revealed that the price difference for maize meal across 
the border of the two neighbouring countries exceeds the transport cost. The 
price for a tonne of maize meal in Maseru is R1 212, whereas in Ladybrand, 
which is approximately 20km from Maseru, it is R1 040. Transport cost from 
Ladybrand to Maseru is R21, which is R151 lower than the difference between 
the Maseru and Ladybrand maize meal price. According to the Ministry of 
Agriculture (1997), informal imports of maize have increased. However, it is 
not as high as has been expected. 
 
Van Zyl et al (1996) recommended to the Government of Lesotho to 
concentrate on the provision of timely information to facilitate the proper 
working of the maize market. It seems that the improper working of the new 
liberalised market in Lesotho should, at leaset partly, be ascribed to the 
inability of the Government of Lesotho to provide timely information to the 
general population of Lesotho. The welfare increase due to liberalisation is 
therefore substantially lower than what it should have been, had the 




The results of this study show that marketing arrangements for maize in 
Lesotho were highly distorted and imposed a heavy tax on the Lesotho 
economy in terms of deadweight losses in efficiency. It resulted in 




and agricultural households who are net consumers of this commodity. These 
distortions inhibited the development of the private sector, which ultimately 
keeps producer prices down. The Lesotho Government has moved in the right 
direction by liberalising its maize market. Unfortunately, Lesotho was not 
able to get the full benefit of this recent move because information on the 
deregulation and how the new maize market works has not reached the 
people who should reap the benefits of the new system. In order to be more 
successful, a few things will have to be done. First, one of the necessary 
conditions for effective competition and efficient markets is that all buyers 
and sellers have perfect- and equal knowledge of all prices and the factors 
that affect market conditions. Information is needed for production and 
marketing decisions. Providing information to make markets work is an 
important function of government. Currently, it is not geared to do this on a 
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